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Abstract
In this paper, automated user verification techniques for
smartphones are investigated. A unique non-commercial
dataset, the University of Maryland Active Authentication
Dataset 02 (UMDAA-02) for multi-modal user authentica-
tion research is introduced. This paper focuses on three
sensors - front camera, touch sensor and location service
while providing a general description for other modali-
ties. Benchmark results for face detection, face verification,
touch-based user identification and location-based next-
place prediction are presented, which indicate that more ro-
bust methods fine-tuned to the mobile platform are needed
to achieve satisfactory verification accuracy. The dataset
will be made available to the research community for pro-
moting additional research.
1. Introduction
The recent proliferation of mobile devices like smart-
phones and tablets has given rise to security concerns about
personal information stored in them. Studies show that
users are more concerned about the security of their cell
phones over laptops [5]. Though over 40% of users in ma-
jor U.S. cities have lost their phones or have been victims
of phone theft [12], industry surveys estimate that 34% of
smartphone users in the U.S. do not lock their phones with
passwords [1]. This contradictory behavior is due to the
time-consuming, cumbersome and error-prone hassles of
entering passwords on virtual keyboards or due to users’ be-
liefs that extra passwords are not needed [12]. 76% attacks
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Figure 1. Association of smartphone sensors with behavioral and
biometric information.
on smart phones exploit weak passwords [39], but users still
prefer those over stronger passwords, as the stronger pass-
words are difficult to remember and type, especially since
the average cell phone user checks their smartphone device
150 times per day [26].
Going beyond traditional passwords and fingerprint-
based one-time authentication, the concept of Active Au-
thentication (AA) has emerged recently [29], where the en-
rolled user is authenticated continuously in the background
based on the user’s biometrics such as front camera face
capture [34], [10], touch screen gesture [11], [42], typing
pattern [2] etc. Conceptually, in an AA system users do
not password-lock the phone at all. When a user uses the
phone, the AA system compares the usage pattern with the
enrolled user’s pattern of use. If the system deems that the
usage patterns are sufficiently similar, the phone’s full func-
tionality (including sensitive applications and data) is made
available, else it blocks the current user. At present, most
of the AA systems are based on face, touch and typing pat-
tern biometrics. As shown in Fig. 1, modern smartphones
provide multiple sensors associated with a variety of be-
havioral and physiological biometric information, however
research on multi-modal authentication using multi-sensor
data is lagging behind, because of paucity of datasets.
The first non-commercial dataset on smartphone us-
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age containing a wide range of sensor data, namely the
University of Maryland Active Authentication Dataset 02
(UMDAA-02), is introduced in this paper. Unlike task-
based data collection schemes, the data collection was pas-
sive and hence is representative of the natural, regular
smartphone usage by the volunteers. The data collection
application ran on the Nexus-5 device, completely in the
background, saving sensor data and periodically uploading
the data to a secure online location.
The benchmark results of 4 experiments on the
UMDAA-02 dataset are reported in this paper. Face is the
most widely used biometric, but the images captured by the
front-facing camera of smartphones present certain chal-
lenges such as partial face detection under occlusion and
large variations in pose and illumination. The face images
in the UMDAA-02 dataset are difficult to detect and the
performances of traditional face detection methods are ex-
plored on a smaller annotated subset of the dataset. Next,
faces of the annotated subset are verified using multiple
state-of-the-art features and distance measures. On the full
dataset, swipe-based user identification has been performed.
Also, utilizing the user’s geolocation information, the next
place prediction experiment is performed which can be use-
ful in AA research when fusing multiple modalities.
2. Previous Works
Among the AA techniques, the most explored are
based on faces [10], [34], touch/swipe signature[37],
multi-modal fusion [42], gait [8] and device movement-
patterns/accelerometer [30], [6]. Face-based authentication,
though most accurate, requires more computational power
and can cause faster battery drain if the images are captured
frequently. On the other hand, swipe and accelerometer data
alone are not discriminative enough. Among the other AA
approaches, in [14], the authors fused stylometry with appli-
cation usage, web browsing data and location information.
Various protocols for AA with and without multi-modal
fusion have been suggested over the years. In [32], the au-
thors explored the idea of progressive or risk-based authen-
tication by combining multiple verification signals to deter-
mine the users level of authenticity. The AA system sur-
faces only when this level is too low for the content being
requested. In [18], the authors proposed context aware pro-
tocols for more flexible yet robust authentication. In [33],
the authors discuss three possible levels of fusion (a) fu-
sion at feature level, (b) fusion at score level, and (c) fu-
sion at decision level. Different fusion algorithms based on
k-Nearest Neighbour classifiers, Support Vector Machines,
decision trees, Bayesian methods, Gaussian Mixture Mod-
els (GMM) have been employed. [33], [7].
The MOBIO dataset [25] is a well-known dataset for
face-based AA research. It contains 61 hours of audio-
visual data from a NOKIA N93i phone (and a 2008 Mac-
book laptop) with 12 distinct sessions of 150 participants
spread over several weeks. However, since users were re-
quired to position their head inside a certain elliptical box
within the scene while capturing the data, the face images of
this dataset do not represent real-life acquisition scenarios.
Faces captured by the front camera (and also screen
touch data) of University of Maryland Active Authentica-
tion Dataset (UMDAA-01) [42][34] of 50 users are uncon-
strained and hence presents a more realistic and challeng-
ing scenario for face-based continuous authentication where
partially visible, frontal and non-frontal faces under vari-
ous illumination conditions are available. In [23] and [36],
the authors introduced facial segment-based face detection
(FSFD) method and deep feature-based face detection for
UMDAA-01-FD which is a small annotated subset of the
UMDAA-01 dataset, respectively, and showed that the par-
tial face detection capabilities of these methods make them
suitable candidates for mobile front-camera face detection.
The MIT Reality Dataset [9] consists of call logs, Blue-
tooth devices in proximity, cell tower IDs, application us-
age, and phone status (such as charging and idle) infor-
mation from 100 Nokia-6600 smart phones users collected
over 450,000 hours. Since it focused on analyzing social
behavior of the subjects, it does not contain vital biomet-
rics such as face and touch. The Rice Livelab dataset [38]
consists of information on application usage, wifi networks,
cell towers, GPS readings, battery usage and accelerometer
output of 35 users, collected from iPhone 3GS devices over
durations ranging from a few days to less than a year.
The largest known dataset on smartphone usage is the
Google’s Project Abacus data set consisting of 27.62 TB
of smartphone sensor signals collected from approximately
1500 users for six months on Nexus 5 phones [27]. Data
was collected for the front-facing camera, touchscreen and
keyboard, gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, ambi-
ent light sensor, GPS, Bluetooth, WiFi, cell antennae, app
usage and on time statistics. Google also collected the
114GB Project Move data set, which consists of smart-
phone inertial signals collected from 80 volunteers over two
months on LG3, Nexus5, and Nexus6 phones. The data
collection was passive for both projects. To date, neither of
these two datasets are available for the research community.
3. Description of the UMDAA-02 Dataset
The UMDAA-02 data set consists of 141.14 GB of
smartphone sensor signals collected from 48 volunteers on
Nexus 5 phones over a period of 2 months (15 Oct. 2015
to 20 Dec. 2015). The data collection sensors include the
front-facing camera, touchscreen, gyroscope, accelerom-
eter, magnetometer, light sensor, GPS, Bluetooth, WiFi,
proximity sensor, temperature sensor and pressure sensor.
The data collection application also stored the timing of
screen lock and unlock events, start and end time stamps
Table 1. Significant Information for Each Modality Per Session
Modality Information
Accelerometer Event Time, X, Y, Z
Gyroscope Event Time, X, Y, Z
Image Shutter Time, Filename
Bluetooth Developer, Paired/Unpaired Flag
Location Event Time, Lat., Long., Accuracy
Usage Event Time, % CPU, % Memory
Magnetic Field Event Time, X, Y, Z
Gravity Event Time, X, Y, Z
Connectivity Capture Time, Flag (Bluetooth, Gps, Wifi,
Cell Network), Network Name and Code
Foreground App
Info
Start Time, Duration, End Time, App
Name, Launched From Home Flag
WiFi SSID, BSSID, Authentication Type, IP
Address, RSSI
Ambient Light Event Time, Value
Ambient Cells MCC, CI, MNC, Sig. Strength, TAC
Screen Event Time, Key
Motion/Touch Event Time, Type, Pressure, Major-Minor
Axis, Position
Call Event Time, Key
Key Event Time, Pressure, Type, Key Code
Screen Res Event Time, X, Y
Table 2. Information on UMDAA-02 and UMDAA-02-FD Dataset
Description UMDAA-02 UMDAA-02-FD
No. of Subjects 36M, 12F 34M, 10F
Age Range (years) 22− 31 22− 31
Avg. Days/User (days) v 10 v 10
Avg. Sessions/User v 248 v 200
Total Number of Images 600712 33209
No. of Images without Faces − 9060
Avg. Images/User v 12515 v 755
Avg. Images/Session v 51 v 4
Min. no. of Image for a User 1038 64
Max. no. of Image for a User 49023 2787
of calls, currently running foreground application etc. The
volunteers used the research phone as their primary device
for a week and were given the option to stop data collection
at will and review the stored data prior to sharing.
In Table 1, the most significant information for each
modality associated with the sensor data is presented. Data
for most of the modalities are stored when there is signifi-
cant change in that modality. For example, the GPS data is
stored at a rate proportional to the movement speed of the
phone. The front camera images are captured only for the
first 60 seconds for each session at a rate of 3 fps.
Some general information on the dataset is provided in
Table 2. The usage information is arranged in ‘Sessions’
which starts when the user unlocks the phone and ends
when the phone goes to the locked state. The data is stored
in nested folders with the year, month, day and start time of
the session embedded in the folder names.
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Figure 2. (a) Histogram of number of images per user, and (b)
histogram of number of sessions per user.
Figure 3. Sample images from one of the users showing a wide
variety of pose, illumination, occlusion and expression variations.
4. Face Detection and User Verification
In this section, we describe face detection and verifica-
tion tasks from faces captured by the front-facing camera.
Fig. 2 shows histograms of number of images per user and
the number of sessions per user. The number of images
varies between 2000 to 50, 000 per user and the number of
sessions varies between 25 and 750, thus providing a large
number of images for each user and session.
UMDAA-02-FD Face Detection Dataset: State-of-the-
art face detection algorithms that perform satisfactorily on
datasets like faces-in-the-wild [19], [20] are not suitable for
detecting partially visible faces that are typically present in
the UMDAA-02 dataset. Moreover, for practical implemen-
tation purposes, the algorithm must be very fast and have a
high recall rate to ensure continuous authentication [23]. A
few sample images are shown in Fig. 3 which shows that the
faces suffer from partial visibility, illumination changes, oc-
clusion and wide variation in poses and facial expressions.
Excluding the data of 5 users from a phone whose front
camera malfunctioned during data collection phases, a set
of 33209 images was selected from all sessions of the re-
maining 43 users at an interval of 7 seconds. The images
were manually annotated for ground truth face bounding
box, face orientation and five landmarks - left eye, right
eye, nose, left and right corners of the mouth to create
the UMDAA-02 face detection dataset (UMDAA-02-FD).
Some information on the UMDAA-02-FD is provided in
Table 2. The chronology and session information of all
the images are also available. The histogram of face height
and width distribution shown in Fig. 4 indicates that face
widths vary approximately from 400 to 650 pixels, while
face heights vary approximately from 300 to 700 pixels.
The database contains many partial faces as can be seen
from the extremities of the distribution, information from
which can help tune the hyper-parameters of face detectors.
Evaluation of Face Detection Performances: Accuracy
and F1-score measures are adopted as evaluation metrics
Figure 4. Distribution of bounding box width and heights
Table 3. Comparison between FD methods at 50% overlap
Method Accuracy F1-Score Time/Image(s)
VJ [40] 60.24 64.50 0.16
DPM [43] 62.62 65.50 5.51
LAEO [24] 19.40 32.49 4.57
FSFD(Cbest)[23] 73.48 79.11 0.68
DP2MFD[31] 76.15 82.83 15.0(CPU),
0.8(GPU)
for face detection to ensure that both precision and recall
performances are taken into consideration. The processing
time per image is also measured to analyze the suitability
for real-time operations. Prior to face detection, the images
are down sampled by 4 to ensure reasonable processing time
for all algorithms. 50% intersection-over-union overlap be-
tween the detection results and the ground truth bounding
box is considered to be the threshold for correct detection.
The performances of four face detection algorithms on
the UMDAA-02-FD dataset are presented in Table 3. The
recently proposed Facial Segment-Based Face Detector
(FSFD) algorithm [23] (with number of random subset
ζ = 20 and minimum number of segments c = 2), which is
specifically designed for detecting partial faces, performs
better than other popular non-commercial detectors like
Viola-Jones (VJ) [40] and Deformable Part-based Model
(DPM) [43] and in reasonable processing time. Another
recent FD technique, the Deep Pyramid Deformable Part
Model (DP2MFD) [31] utilizes normalized convolutional
neural network (CNN) features. It outperforms all the
other methods in terms of Accuracy and F1-Score but the
processing time is quite long (almost 100 times more than
VJ) thus making it unattractive for realtime implementation
on smartphones. However, the best scores are far from
satisfactory and better face detectors for AA are needed.
Face-based User Verification: Face verification is per-
formed on the UMDAA-02-FD dataset. For each annotated
face, 68 fiducial landmarks are extracted using the Local
Deep Descriptor Regression (LDDR) method trained on Im-
agenet and FDDB datasets [22]. Feature extraction is per-
formed after alignment, centering and cropping.
Feature Extraction from Faces: Given a face image, pixel
intensity, Local Binary Pattern (LBP) [28] and Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN) features using the pre-trained
Alexnet network [21] and the DCNN network [4] are ex-
tracted. In total, 6 different features are extracted for each
Figure 5. Flow diagram for features extraction for face verification.
Figure 6. Block diagram depicting the face verification protocol.
face as shown in fig. 5.
• F1: Pre-processed faces are converted to grayscale,
rescaled (32 × 32) and vectorized (1024 dimensional
vector).
• F2: From the 64 × 64 rescaled grayscale image, LBP
features of size 8 × 8 × 58 (3712 dimensional vector)
are extracted for a cell size of 8× 8 pixels.
• F3: Bounding boxes of the eyes, nose and mouth are
computed from the landmarks with a 5 pixel margin for
each face part from the pre-processed grayscale image.
The eyes, nose and mouth bounding boxes are resized
to 14×18, 21×13 and 11×23 pixels respectively, then
vectorized to a 1030 dimensional MEEN feature[10].
• F4: LBP features (2842 dimensional) are obtained
from each of the resized bounding boxes of MEEN
parts (F3) with a cell size of 4× 4 pixels.
• F5: The first five convolutional layers of Alexnet are
used to extract features of size 6×6×256 (9216 dimen-
sional) from resized color images of faces (227× 227)
• F6: Landmarks are input to the DCNN based face ver-
ification system [4] trained on the CASIA-WebFace
dataset [41], which resizes the face to (125× 125× 3)
and then outputs a 320 dimensional feature vector.
Evaluation Protocol: Six types of feature vectors are con-
sidered in this experiment. In the absence of any particular
enrollment data, to simulate a practical AA scenario, the
faces are sorted chronologically for each user and the first
N faces are considered for enrollment while the rest are
used for verification. The mean of the features of the en-
rollment set of a user followed by L2 normalization of the
mean vector is stored as his/her template u.
Figure 7. EER (%) vs. M for varying N using DCNN features
(F6) and four different metrics.
Figure 8. EER(%) for 6 feature vectors using four metrics.
Fig. 6 shows a block diagram of the verification process.
A reasonable, practical assumption for robust AA is that
the user is verified by the last M faces instead of a single
one. Therefore features vi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ) are extracted
from each of the M faces for each location of the mov-
ing window, then averaged and L2-normalized to form the
test vector v. The distances between v and u are calculated
using four distance measures, namely, Euclidean Distance
(EU), Cosine Distance (CosD), Manhattan Distance (MD)
and Correlation Distance (CorrD). For the distance measure
δk of type k the score is Ψk = 1
δk
[34].
Experimental Results: In Fig. 7, the equal error rate
(EER) (%) produced by using F6 features are plotted for
varying M and N values for the four distance measures. It
is evident from the plots that the EER decreases with in-
creasing N and M for all the cases. The lowest EER of
18.44% is achieved for N = 20, M = 30 using either
CorrD or CosD measure.
Fig. 8 shows the EER corresponding to different fea-
tures and distance measures considering N = 20, M = 30.
The DCNN features (F6) are found to be the most effec-
tive (EER of 18.44% for CosD). Since, for a reliable sys-
tem the EER is expected to be at least less than 5%, this
value is not satisfactory at all. The poor performance may
be due to the fact that many faces in the dataset are partially
visible and therefore alignment using facial landmarks fails
badly for these cases. Also, matching the features from a
partial face to the features of the same user’s full face may
result in a large distance measure. Among the other meth-
ods, the Alexnet network does not perform much better than
the non-CNN features in this scenario as it is not trained
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Figure 9. Histogram of the number of data points per swipe.
Table 4. General Information on Swipe Data
No. of subjects 48
Avg. Session/User with swipe data v 196
Total taps (finger down-finger up) 177417
Total swipes (including taps) 489723
Maximum data points in a swipe 3637
No. of Swipes/User v 10203
No. of Swipes/Session v 52
No. of Swipes (> 4 data points) v 167126
No. of Swipes/User (> 4 data points) v 3482
No. of Swipes/Session (> 4 data points) v 18
particularly for faces. The LBP of MEEN face (EER of
28.83% for MD) gives the best result among non-CNN fea-
tures. Note that in practice, the CNN feature extraction step
is generally much slower than the non-CNN feature extrac-
tion methods without the use of a GPU. Thus, more robust
yet fast verification methods are needed to produce satisfac-
tory performance on this dataset.
5. User Identification Using Swipe Dynamics
In this experiment, single finger touch sequences
(swipes) on the screen are studied by considering three
types of events - finger down, in-touch and finger up. The
length of swipes vary between 1 to 3637 touch data points
(Fig. 9). For reliable authentication using swipes, longer
ones are preferable [13]. Hence, swipes with more than four
data points are considered for feature extraction. Table 4
summarizes the swipe dataset, shows that it contains a large
number of touch and swipe data per user and therefore can
serve as a data set for practical experiments on swipe-based
authentication. Since the users were not given any particular
task to perform, the touch data in AA-02 is representative of
how users interact with the phone through touch.
Feature Extraction: Every swipe s is encoded as a se-
quence of 4-tuples si = (xi, yi, pi, ti) for i ∈ 1, . . . , Nc
where xi, yi is the location coordinates and pi is the pres-
sure applied at time ti. Nc is the number of data points
captured during the swipe. From each swipe-action data
with Nc ≥ 5, a 24-dimensional feature vector, listed in Ta-
ble 5, is extracted using the method described in [13] and
[42]. Note, in the UMDAA-02 dataset, the measure of area
covered by the finger is not present.
Experimental Setup and Evaluation: The swipe data
for each user (with Nc ≥ 5) are sorted chronologi-
cally and the first 70% swipes are considered for training-
validation while the rest for testing. After extracting the
24-dimensional feature vector from each swipe, the train-
Table 5. Features Extracted From Each Swipe Event
Features Description
1-2 inter-stroke time, stroke duration
3-6 start x, start y, stop x, stop y
7-8 direct end-to-end distance, mean resultant length
9 up/down/left/right flag
10-12 20%, 50%, 80% -perc. pairwise velocity
13-15 20%, 50%, 80%-perc. pairwise acc
16 median velocity at last 3 pts
17 largest deviation from end-to-end (e-e) line
18-20 20%, 50%, 80%-perc. dev. from e-e line
21 average direction
22 ratio of end-to-end dist and trajectory length
23 median acceleration at first 5 points
24 mid-stroke pressure
Figure 10. EER vs. Wswipe.
ing feature matrix is normalized to zero mean and unit vari-
ance. Then individual binary classifiers are trained for each
user following the one-vs-all protocol. The classification
methods considered for this experiment are k-nearest neigh-
bor (KNN) [13], Gaussian kernel Support Vector Machine
(RBF-SVM)[13], Naive Bayes (NB) [37], Linear Regres-
sion (LR) [37], Random Tree estimation followed by Linear
Regression (RT+LR), Random Forest estimator (RF) [3],
[11], [37] and Gradient Boosting Model (GBM) [15]. The
methods are compared based on EER (%).
As proposed in [13], instead of using a single swipe
for authentication, the scores of multiple, consecutive
Wswipes number of swipes are averaged together for robust-
ness. Since all of the methods return confidence probabil-
ities/scores or distance from separating hyper-plane repre-
senting confidence, the score fusion is a simple average of
individual scores. For the nearest neighbor-based methods,
nine neighbors are considered. The parameters of RBF-
SVM are tuned by 10 fold cross validation on smaller sub-
sets of the original training data. Since the training data is
very large, the SVM is trained on a reduced subset, followed
by retraining on the hard negative mined error cases. For the
ensemble-based methods, the number of estimators is set to
200 and the maximum tree depth is set to 10. The EER val-
ues obtained using different methods for differnet Wswipe
values are show in Fig. 10. The random forest (RF ) esti-
mation method outperforms all the other methods and can
reach an EER of 22.1%. However, for practical usage, this
EER is not satisfactory and therefore achieving a better per-
Table 6. General Information on Geo-location Data
No. of Subjects 45
Avg. No. of Sessions/User with Location Data v 186
Total Number of Location Traces 8303813
Number of Location Traces Per User v 184529
Number of Location Traces Per Session v 993
Figure 11. Example of Geo-location Data Clustering - Analysis of
the clusters reveal states of the user such as ’Home’ or ’Work’.
formance for this dataset is a new research challenge.
6. Geo-location Data and Next Place Prediction
The location service of smartphones return geographical
location of the user based on GPS and WiFi network. Ex-
cluding the users who kept their location service off, geolo-
cation data, stored only if there is significant change in the
location, is obtained from 45 users (summarized in Table
6). It is possible to reasonably predict the next location that
a person might visit based on prior knowledge on the pat-
tern on one’s life. In this section, the next place prediction
problem is approached using the geolocation data available
in the UMDAA-02 dataset.
State Definition for Mobility Markov Chains: Loca-
tion histories are first clustered into Ni clusters, namely
C1i . . . C
N
i , for the i-th user using the DBSCAN algorithm
[35] based on distances between data points. The maximum
distance between a point from the center of the cluster in
which that point belongs is set to be below a certain value
R meters. Such clustering for a student (shown in Fig. 11)
reveals the expected dominant regions that the user would
visit - home, university, a certain shop and a restaurant. Two
additional clusters, Transit (Tr) and Unknown (Unk), are
also assigned for each user. If the user is traveling, causing
location information to change rapidly (≥ 2ms−1), then
he/she is assigned to Tr. The remaining data points are de-
noted as Unk.
Data points at each cluster are assigned to six different
observations based on the day and time information. Week-
days and weekend data points are flagged with WD and
WE. Also, the whole day is divided into three time zones
(TZs) - TZ1 (8:00 am to 4:00 pm), TZ2 (4:00 pm to 10:00
pm) and TZ3 (10:00 pm to 8:00 am). Thus, for the i-th user,
there are (Ni+2)×2×3 possible observation states. How-
ever, since the location service only collects data when the
phone is unlocked, there are many gaps in the data and it is
possible that many of these observation states are absent in
the training phase but present in the test data or vice-versa.
Figure 12. Next location prediction Accuracy (left) and
Accuracy3 (right) measures for increasing number of previous
observations for MMC at different R.
The location service data is utilized for development and
evaluation of Mobility Markov Chains (MMC) [17], [16]
which is a discrete stochastic process model of the mobility
behavior of an individual in which the probability of moving
to a state depends only on the last visited state and the tran-
sition matrix for all probable states. Thus an MMC is com-
posed of a set of k-states S = s1, s2, . . . , sk, prior probabil-
ity of entering a state p1, p2, . . . , pk and a set of transitions
ti,j where ti,j = Prob(Xn = sj |Xn−1 = si).
Experimental Setup and Evaluation: From the chrono-
logical organization of a user’s mobility traces, the first 70%
are used for training while the rest for testing. Each trace of
the training set is tagged with a unique tag identifying the
state it belongs to. The prior and transition probabilities
of each state are calculated from the chronological traces.
Since, the number of states for a subject depends upon the
maximum radius parameter R for the clusters, nearby small
clusters get merged into bigger ones with increasingR caus-
ing a reduction in the number of states. In the training set,
the average number of states per user drops to 35 from 144
if the maximum radius is increased to 500 m from 20 m.
MMC-based next location prediction results in terms of
Accuracy and Accuracy3 (percentage of times the correct
next location was among the top 3 most probable locations)
metrics are presented in Fig. 12. The horizontal axis rep-
resents the number of previous observations. Considering
n previous observations, the MMC algorithm returns prob-
abilities of each state to be the next. Since the day and
time zone of the next location are known, states that do
not belong to that day and time zone are dropped. The
most probable state among the rest of the states is picked
as the next predicted location. Fig. 12 indicates that know-
ing more prior states increases the accuracy. The accuracy
also increases with increasing maximum radius R (from 20
meters to 500 meters) at the cost of localization capabil-
ity. Between the two measures, Accuracy3 is can go much
higher (Accuracy = 65.3% and Accuracy3 = 96.6% for
R = 500 meters, n = 8) indicating the feasibility of loca-
tion prediction.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a multi-modal challenge data
set for AA problems. Benchmark results for face and touch-
based active authentication are provided. Preliminary re-
sults for predicting the next location are also given. The
UMDAA-02 is the first non-commercial data set on smart
phone usage containing data form a wide variety of smart
phone sensors. Thus this data set can provide sufficient re-
sources to AA researchers to investigate the efficacy and
performance of multi-modal fusion model for a wide vari-
ety of modalities in a practical AA scenario. The dataset
will be released to the research community in due course.
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